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Abstract. SEAL was first introduced in [1] by Rogaway and Coppersmith as a fast software-oriented encryption algorithm. It is a pseudorandom function which stretches a short index into a much longer pseudorandom string under control of a secret key pre-processed into internal tables. In this paper we first describe an attack of a simplified version of SEAL, which provides large parts of the secret tables from approximately 2 24 algorithm computations. As far as the original algorithm is concerned, we construct a test capable of distinguishing SEAL from a random function using approximately 2 30 IV values. Moreover, we describe how to derive some bits of information about the secret tables. These results were confirmed by computer experiments.
Description of the SEAL Algorithm
SEAL is a length-increasing "pseudorandom" function which maps a 32-bit string n to an L-bit string SEAL(n) under a secret 160-bit key a. The output length L is meant to be variable, but is generally limited to 64 kbytes. In this paper, we assume it is worth exactly 64 kbytes (2 14 32-bit words), but all our results could be obtained with a smaller output length.
The key a is only used to define three secret tables R, S, and T . These tables respectively contain 256, 256 and 512 32-bit values which are derived from the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) [2] using a as the secret key and re-indexing the 160-bit output into 32-bit output words.
SEAL is the result of the two cascaded generators shown below. The first generator uses a routine depending on the a-derived tables R and T depicted at figure 1. It maps the 32-bit string n and the 6-bit counter l to four 32-bit words A 0 , B 0 , C 0 , D 0 and another four 32-bit words n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , n 4 . These eight words are to be used by the second generator.
The second generator uses a routine depending on the a-derived tables depicted at figure 2. There are 64 iterations of this routine, indexed by i = 1 to 64. A 0 B 0 C 0 D 0 serves as an input to the first iteration, producing an
For the next iterations, the input block is alternately (
using the a-derived table S as shown below in figure 3 .
?
? ? ? Concerning the definition of SEAL, more details can be found in [1] and in [2] . The algorithm is divided into three steps.
-First we compute the internal tables under the secret key a. The security of this step relies on SHA which is assumed to be highly secure. Therefore, R, S and T are pseudorandom tables.
, n 3 and n 4 from n, l and table R. This is what we already called the first generator. Let us assume the output is pseudorandom as well.
-Finally, the second generator computes iteratively the
4 values are derived. We change the original notations as follows:
. In this part we found certain weaknesses which are investigated in Sections 3 and 4.
Preliminary

Role of mod 2 32 additions
Although the combined use of the + and ⊕ operations probably strengthens SEAL as compared with a situation where only one of these operations would be used, we do not believe that this represents the main ingredient of the security of SEAL, which is essentially a table-driven algorithm.
As a matter of fact, any x + y sum can be written:
where the carry word c(x, y) is far from being uniformly distributed thus + just introduces an additional, unbalanced term, as compared with ⊕.
This remark led us to assume that replacing in SEAL (more precisely in the second generator of figure 2) all + operators by xors would not fundamentally modify the nature of the algorithm, and that cryptanalytic results obtained with such a simplified version could at least partially be transposed to the real cipher. The results of our analysis of this simplified version of SEAL are summarised in Section 3 hereafter.
The three words
Let us consider the function depicted at figure 2. Given a fixed value of the iteration index i (say i = 3), the input and output to this function are known from the generator outputs (Y
4 ) up to the following unknown words:
, which value does not depend upon the considered initial value (n, l).
-the 2 words n 1 and n 2 , which value depends upon (n, l).
The involvement of the IV-dependent words n 1 and n 2 in the function considerably complicates the analysis of the i th iteration because of the randomisation effect upon the input to output dependency.
In order to find statistics applicable to any IV value, we investigate how to "get rid" of any dependency in n 1 and n 2 in some relations induced by the equation of iteration i.
Let us consider the D i−1 input word and the C i and D i input words. Denote the output tables involved in the right part of figure 2 by:
It is easy to establish the relation: 32 additions by xors. The attack is divided into four steps.
Step 1
We derive the unordered set of values of the T table, up to an unknown 32-bit constant D i . Relation (1) above represents the starting point for this derivation. After replacing + by ⊕ in (1) and
4 respectively, we obtain the relation:
where the ∆ i constant depends upon the S 
Step 2
The purpose of the second step is to compute a constant α i which is needed in the third step in order to find out statistics involving Fig. 2.) . Consider the following equation (3) established in a similar way to (2) from the relation between B i−1 and the output words:
where
For each sample, we can find out T 3 ⊕ ∆ i by searching exhaustively the right combination (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ) in equation (2) . In order to save time, we compute once and for all a table with the 2 18 values of (T 1 ⊕ T 2 ) 18 and search for the right third value. We perform this search as well as the computation of the left term of (3) for 2 21 samples. Once in 2 18 , T 1 = T 2 and T 3 = T 4 . This way the constant value α i we are looking for appears at least 4 times.
Step 3
The purpose of this step is to find out various values of n 1 . Once we have these values, we can make out the relation between the in and outputs of table T up to one constant value. Let us consider equation (4) established from the relation between A i−1 and the output words: (4)
We can find out T 2 ⊕ ∆ i and T 4 ⊕ ∆ i by searching the right combination of (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 ) in equation (2) using the value α i we made out in step 2. For each sample we compute, we get about 16 possibilities, as (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 ) gives 2
36 possible values for a 32-bit word. In order to find the right combination, let us consider two distinct iteration indexes i and j: we know that for a given l value, if i is even (or odd), we always xor the same n 1 (or n 3 ) to the input A. Let us therefore take two rounds i and j that are both odd (or even). We need to know table T ⊕ ∆ i , table T ⊕ ∆ j , α i and α j . We collect samples of: We xor all the samples of round i with all the samples of round j. One of these values is the right combination of
Then we find all the samples for rounds i and j of another value n 1 (i.e. of round l). We compare these two sets of samples and make out the right value of n 1 18 ⊕ β i . This step can be repeated various times to collect values of n 1 while computing only once the tables T ⊕ ∆ and the constants α.
Step 4
In this step we finally derive the in and outputs of table T from equation (5):
In this equation p 1 is the input of table T . We have seen in the first three steps that we can derive the value of T 1 from in and output samples of SEAL.
So we finally derive several values of:
Summary
Summing up the four steps we have just described, we can break the T table up to one constant value using about 2 × 2 21 samples of (n, l) for step 1, 2 × 2 21 samples of (n, l) for step 2 and about 2 9 values of (n, l) for steps 3 and 4. This means, the T table can be broken using about 2 24 samples of (n, l). We could probably go on breaking the simplified version of SEAL by finding out sets of values (n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , n 4 ), then trying to break the first generator and find table R, but this is not our purpose here.
A Test of the Real Version of SEAL
In this Section we use some of the ideas of Vaudenay's Statistical Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers [3] to distinguish SEAL from a truly random function.
χ 2 Cryptanalysis
The purpose of Vaudenay's paper is to prove that statistical analysis on ciphers such as DES may provide as efficient attacks as linear or differential cryptanalysis. Statistical analysis enables to recover very low biases and a simple χ 2 test can get very good results even without knowing exactly what happens inside the inner loops of the algorithm or the S-boxes.
We intend to use this property to detect low biases of a certain combination of the output words of SEAL suggested by the analysis made in Section 3 in order to prove SEAL is far from being undistinguishable from a pseudo-random function. This provides a first test of the SEAL algorithm.
Number of samples needed for the χ 2 test to distinguish a biased distribution from an unbiased one
We denote by N the number of samples computed. We assume the samples are drawn from a set of r values. We call n i the number of occurrences of the i th of the r values among the N samples and S χ 2 the associated indicator:
The χ 2 test compares the value of this indicator to the one an unbiased distribution would be likely to provide. If the n i were drawn according to an unbiased multinomial distribution of parameters ( 1 r , 1 r ,..., 1 r ), the expectation and the standard deviation of the S χ 2 estimator would be given by:
If the distribution of the n i is still multinomial but biased, say with probabilities p 1 , ..., p r , then we can compute the new expected value µ of the S χ 2 :
It can be easily shown that:
An order of magnitude of the number N of samples needed by the χ 2 test to distinguish a biased distribution from an unbiased one with substantial probability is given by the condition:
µ − µ σ which gives us the following order of magnitude for N :
Model of the test
Let us consider equation (2) with the real scheme (including the sums). We can rewrite it:
where r 1 and r 2 are the carry bits created by the addition of T 1 and T 2 , and r 3 and r 4 the ones of the addition of S i−1 4
and S i 4 . We apply the χ 2 test to the four leftmost bits of Y 4 ⊕ Y 3 9 ⊕ X 4 18 suspecting a slight bias in this expression. Without having carefully analysed the exact distribution of the sum of the four carries, we intend to prove that its convolution with the biased distribution of T 3 9 ⊕ (T 1 ⊕ T 2 ) 18 ⊕ ∆ i 9 does result in a still slightly unbalanced distribution.
As we take 4-bit samples, we apply the χ 2 test with r − 1 = 15 degrees of freedom. Detailed information about this test can be found in [4] . 
Results
Whenever we analyse at least 2 33 samples, the test proves with probability 1 1000
to be wrong, that SEAL has a biased distribution. We have made several tests, and each time the value of the S χ 2 estimator we obtained for this order of magnitude of N was greater than 45 for the 4 leftmost bits and greater than 320 for the 8 leftmost bits. In other words, the test proves that the distribution is a biased one.
If the two leftmost bits of S i 4 can be found, the test works with 2 30 samples or less. Similar results are found when testing the eight leftmost bits of the samples. Figure 4 shows the value of the S χ 2 estimator for tests made with a = 0x67452301. Fig. 4 . Results of the tests with up to 2 35 samples of (n, l).
These and many more figures have been computed using various tests and trying out different cases.
Deriving first information on SEAL
It appears in equation (2), only r 4 has some influence in making the number of samples increase by a factor 4. Whenever the two leftmost bits of S i 4 are found, we know part of r 4 and the χ 2 test gives much better results then with wrong bits of S i 4 . Therefore we can derive at least two bits of information on table S. If the test is applied to more than the four leftmost bits of the samples, more than 2 bits can be derived from secret table T . Whenever these bits are right, the χ 2 rises much faster than for wrong values. Compute about 2 32 samples of the four leftmost bits of Y 3 9 ⊕ X 4 18 and Y 4 and store the frequencies of every value of these 8 bits. For every possible value of the four leftmost bits of S 
Conclusion
We have shown in some detail in Section 3 that the simpler scheme with xors instead of sums can be broken with about:
-2 21 samples of (n, l) for each one of the two tables T ⊕ ∆ of step 1;
-2 21 samples of (n, l) for each one of the two values of α of step 2; -512 samples of n for n 1 and β in steps 3 and 4, depending mostly upon how many elements of table T ⊕ ∆ you find in step 1. For each n, we find l and l such that the corresponding values n 1 and n 1 can be found when comparing all the results between rounds i and j.
The attack of Section 3 can therefore be realised with about 2 24 samples of (n, l). The test of Section 4 can be applied with about 2 32 samples of (n, l) and first information about table S can be derived from this test with 2 32 samples of (n, l) as well. A good idea of secret table S can therefore be obtained with the same amount of samples of (n, l) but slightly more operations.
We believe the attack we showed can be adapted to the real scheme of SEAL, but we did not investigate wether the complexity is within reasonable range.
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